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LEARNING SOMETHING MORE THAN  
LAW FROM MARYLAND DECISIONS 
 
Ian Gallacher* 
 
 As lawyers, and law students, we look at cases in a somewhat clinical manner.  
We tend to glide over the facts and concentrate on the point of law articulated by the 
court.  If we need to use a case to support a position we are taking, or if we want to 
distinguish a case used by an opponent, we might look to the facts of the case to see if 
they affect our argument.  But the facts themselves, and the story they can tell us about 
the people involved, tend to be ignored. 
 There is nothing surprising or wrong about this.  We are lawyers, after all, not 
historians or sociologists, and our clients are not interested about why Mr. Tompkins 
was walking on the tracks of the Erie Railroad Company or whether Krause v.  Rhodes 
tells us more about life in America in 1970 than it does about the narrow legal issues 
discussed by the Supreme Court.  But just as our clients require us to focus on their 
needs and to solve their problems, we should remember that each of the cases we use as 
the building blocks of the common law meant something profoundly more important to 
the individual litigants. 
 Three years ago I was looking for the first reported class action in Maryland in 
support of an article I was writing.1  My search methodology was not the sophisticated 
plan taught in the University of Baltimore’s LARW program.  Rather, I started reading 
on the first page of the first volume of the Maryland Reports and kept going until I found 
the case.  The search was short – I found the case at 2 Md. 574 (1852) – but when I read 
the case I realized that it offered an insight into much more than the history of 
representative litigation in Maryland.  It, and two subsequently reported decisions (at 5 
Md. 287 (1853) and  9 Md. 145 (1856)), tell a compelling story of life in rural Maryland in 
the middle of the 19th Century.  They also tell of courage, the importance of freedom, and 
                                                 
*  Instructor-in-Residence, Legal Rhetoric Department, The Washington College of Law, 
American University.  B.A.(Hons.), University of Leeds,  M.F.A., Carnegie-Mellon University,  
J.D.,  The Washington College of Law, American University.  Thanks as always to Julia 
McKinstry. 
1  Representative Litigation in Maryland:  The Past, Present, And Future Of The Class 
Action Rule In State Court,  58 U. Md. L. Rev. 1510 (1999).  A shorter version of the story told 
here can be found in this article. 
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the corrosive quality of greed.  And, if these other elements weren’t enough, they teach us 
lessons about 19th Century civil procedure, evidence and trial practice as well. 
 In telling the story here, I have tried to stay away from the traditional scholarly 
apparatus that usually accompanies articles about the law.  Footnotes have a way of 
interfering with narrative and I want to focus here on the story itself. The basic facts of 
this story are largely contained in the Court of Appeals’ three reported decisions.  Other 
sources are identified in an endnote. 
 I. John and Jeremiah Townshend 
 In the middle of the 19th Century, John Townshend was a farmer in the 
Piscataway district of Prince George’s County, where he probably farmed tobacco on his 
1,500 acre farm.  John was a religious man who claimed to speak directly with God, and 
had long been regarded as an eccentric in the area.  Despite his religious beliefs, though, 
John was a working farmer with a sizeable farm to manage.  As with all businessmen, 
now and then, John sought to maximize his profits by minimizing his expenses, and the 
cheapest source of farm workers in America at that time was slave labor.  Accordingly, 
John maintained about 70 slaves on his property.  
 John’s conscience was troubled by his slave ownership, however, and his divine 
conversations helped to clarify a plan to free his slaves.  As a pragmatic farmer, though, 
John could not free the slaves immediately.  So it was that on Christmas Eve, 1831, and 
again on February 6, 1846, John executed deeds of manumission that freed the slaves at 
his death.  Indeed, he went further than that and left his slaves all his real estate, 
including his farm.  This must have been a crushing blow for John’s son, Jeremiah.  
 We know a little, though only a little, about Jeremiah Townshend.  He was 28 
years old when his father died, was married and had at least one child.  The first accurate 
information we have about him comes from the 1850 Federal Census which tells us that, 
by then, he had five children and lived on land valued at $1,260.  The slave schedule 
attached to the 1850 census indicates two Townshends in the Piscataway district who 
were slave owners.  The first, William Townshend, (perhaps Jeremiah’s brother or uncle) 
had eight slaves.  The initial of the second Townshend is unreadable, but it is likely that 
this second Townshend was Jeremiah.  At the time of the 1850 census, Jeremiah had 
increased the number of slaves on the farm to 99, 58 men and boys, and 41 women and 
girls, ranging in age from 2 to 77 years old.  No further information about the slaves is 
recorded.  
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II. The Legal Maneuvering Begins 
 John died in May, 1846, and Jeremiah acted to consolidate his position.  He, 
along with John’s other heirs, filed a petition in the Orphan’s Court of Prince George’s 
County, and later in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, claiming that John had 
been insane since 1794.  This was an astounding contention:  a son was claiming that his 
father had been insane for 50 years, despite John’s ability to farm the land and otherwise 
manage his affairs.  Nonetheless, the petition was successful and John’s will was declared 
null and void.  As soon as it was, Jeremiah took possession of John’s 70 slaves and must 
have thought that his battle for control of his father’s property was over.  But the 
invalidation of John’s will had no effect on his deeds of manumission, and in 1847, two 
slaves – known only by their first names, “Jerry” and “Anthony” – petitioned for freedom 
based on them.  Their petition was filed on behalf of themselves and the 68 other slaves 
whom John had sought to free. 
 The slaves faced a daunting prospect.  They can have known little, if anything, 
about the legal mechanisms necessary to bring their petition, and the odds were stacked 
against them by the Maryland legislature.  Chapter 67 of the 1796 Acts of the General 
Assembly of Maryland was a clear attempt to dissuade members of the Maryland bar 
from helping slaves obtain their freedom, stating that in all cases of petitions for freedom 
where the petition was dismissed, “the attorney prosecuting or appearing to the same 
shall pay all legal costs arising thereon, unless the courts, before whom the same may be 
brought, shall be of the opinion, under all circumstances, that there was probable ground 
to suppose that said petitioner or petitioners had a right to freedom.”  Even worse, the 
Act decreed that all petitions for freedom should “commence and be tried only in the 
county where such petitioner or petitioners shall reside.”  And both parties to the 
petition for freedom could request a jury trial and exercise peremptory challenges to up 
to twelve of the prospective jurors. 
 In other words, even if Jerry and Anthony could find a lawyer willing to incur the 
costs of a failed petition for freedom, their case would be heard in Prince George’s 
County, and Jeremiah Townshend could not only require the case to be heard by a jury, 
he would be able to exercise sufficient challenges to ensure that the jury was, in large 
part, composed of farmers and slave owners like himself.  Slaves seeking freedom could 
hardly face a less sympathetic audience. 
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 Despite the odds, Jerry and Anthony found a lawyer, Thomas S. Alexander, who 
stayed with them throughout the nine years their case moved through Maryland’s legal 
system.  I have been unable to find to more about Alexander, but in addition to being 
loyal to clients who could not have any hope of paying him for his work, and being 
someone willing to incur significant potential expenses as the result of his representation 
(not usual practice for lawyers, even in the 19th Century), he was clearly someone who 
knew what he was doing.   
Recognizing the impossibility of winning the case in front of a Prince George’s 
County jury, Alexander sought to remove the case to Anne Arundel County.   In support, 
he filed an affidavit alleging that the slaves could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in 
Prince George’s County, and invoked Chapter 518 of the Acts of 1849 which provided 
that: 
in any suit or action of law now pending, or hereafter to be commenced or 
instituted, in any county courts of this State, or in the court of Howard 
District, the judges thereof, upon suggestion in writing, by either of the 
parties thereto or their attorneys, supported by affidavit or other proper 
evidence, either before or after issue joined in said cause, that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be had in the county courts of the county, or in the 
court of Howard district [sic.] where such writ or action may be 
depending, shall and may order and direct the record of their proceedings 
in such suit or action, to be transmitted to the judges of any county court 
of any adjoining judicial district for trial, and the judges of such county 
court, to whom the said record may be transmitted, shall hear and 
determine the same in like manner and to the same extent as if such suit 
or action had been originally instituted therein. 
 
 Alexander’s strategy worked at first:  the Prince George’s County court allowed 
the removal.  But Jeremiah petitioned in Anne Arundel County court for a remand of the 
case to Prince George’s County, and his petition was granted.  This decision was appealed 
to the Court of Appeals and the case made the first of its three appearances before that 
Court in 1852. 
 III. The First Court Of Appeals Decision 
 Jeremiah Townshend had also retained a lawyer, and in contrast to the little we 
know of Thomas Alexander, much is known about his counterpart, Thomas Fielder 
Bowie.  General Bowie, as he was known, was born in 1808 in Prince George’s County, 
and was educated at Charlotte Hall and Union College in Schenectady.  He had served as 
Deputy Attorney-General for Prince George’s county, and had also been elected to the 
State Legislature.  Bowie mounted an unsuccessful challenge for his cousin’s 
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Congressional seat in 1851, and in 1854 he was successful in his Congressional bid, 
remaining for two terms.  He died in 1869.  
 Bowie raised two technical questions before the Court of Appeals:  first, he 
questioned the constitutionality of chapter 518 of the 1849 Act which Alexander had used 
to gain the removal of the case to Anne Arundel county;  second, he questioned whether 
a petition for freedom was a suit at law, as required by chapter 518.  Although this second 
point appeared to be a relatively benign question, it was potentially devastating to Jerry 
and Anthony’s case.  Maryland slaves could not bring actions at law.  Accordingly, if a 
petition for freedom was not an action at law – and self-evidently it could not be because 
it could only be brought by a slave – then chapter 518 could not, under its plain terms, 
apply to the case, which would therefore have to be heard in Prince George’s County. 
 Somewhat paradoxically, Bowie then used the common law in support of his first 
position.  Because, he argued, the common law provided that a trial should be argued in 
the same vicinage where a fact occurred, any legislation which permitted the removal of a 
case beyond the bounds of the judicial district where the relevant acts occurred was in 
derogation of the common law, and was therefore unconstitutional. 
 The three judges of the Court of Appeals (Chief Justice Le Grand and Justices 
Eccleston and Mason) were not impressed.  Justice Mason delivered the Court’s opinion, 
in which he observed that the 1849 Act was consistent with Maryland’s constitution, and 
that the ability of the legislature to “regulate at will the subject of removals” had been 
well established since at least the Act of 1804.  Accordingly, the Court found the 1849 Act 
to be constitutional and held that cases meeting its requirements could be removed from 
one judicial district to another. 
 On the second, and more difficult, question, the Court of Appeals confronted the 
problem directly. 
All laws for the removal of causes from one vicinage to another, were 
passed for the purpose of promoting the ends of justice, by getting rid of 
the influence of some local prejudice which might be supposed to operate 
detrimentally to the interests and rights of one or the other of the parties 
to the suit.  This is a common law right belonging to all our courts, and as 
such can be exercised by them in all cases, when not modified or 
controlled by our constitutional or statutory enactments. . . .  The reason 
of the law would apply with equal force to a case like the present, as to one 
strictly and technically embraced within the term “action at law.”  The 
plaintiff in the present suit, of all the classes in our community, belongs to 
that which is the most defenseless.  Our laws give him a standing in court 
to prosecute his petition for freedom.  An unimpeachable attorney of the 
court makes oath that he cannot have justice done him in his own county.  
Under such circumstances, would it not be a mockery of justice to refuse 
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him his application to have the cause removed?  Would it not involve a 
contradiction of terms to say that he shall have the benefit of our courts of 
justice, but at the same time that his case shall be tried in a county where 
he cannot have a fair and impartial trial? 
 
 This is an interesting early example of judicial nullification.  A plain reading of 
the 1849 Act supports Bowie’s position, yet the Court of Appeals recognized that to give 
the Act its plain meaning would deprive the slaves of any realistic opportunity to exercise 
their limited rights under Maryland law.  So the Court of Appeals held that a petition for 
freedom, although not technically an action at law, was “embraced within the meaning of 
the terms ‘suit or action at law.’”  Jerry and Anthony’s case would be heard in Anne 
Arundel County. 
 IV. The Second Court Of Appeals Decision 
 Jeremiah Townshend, though, was not finished.  Thomas Bowie was no longer 
his lawyer – whether because Jeremiah was dissatisfied with his representation, because 
of a fee dispute or because Bowie was preparing for his successful Congressional bid is 
unclear – but Jeremiah had an interesting legal strategy up his sleeve.  He filed a bill in 
equity back in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, arguing that his father’s 
insanity meant that his deeds of manumission should be considered inoperative and 
invalid.  He also acknowledged, however, that the deeds appeared to be valid and that he 
would therefore be compelled to defend against them.  Thus, Jeremiah argued,  he would 
be “put to enormous and ruinous costs from the multiplicity of suits, and be unjustly and 
greatly harassed, and put to great charges in defending the same, which will be a direct 
charge upon the common property of complainants.”  So he sought consolidation of all 
the claims of freedom in one equity suit, and he sought an injunction restraining the 
petitions for freedom from being heard until John Townshend’s personal estate (which 
included the slaves) was divided among his heirs and until the issue of John 
Townshend’s sanity had been litigated. 
 Jeremiah’s position conveniently ignored the fact that the slaves were bringing 
one petition for freedom which would resolve the rights of all slaves manumitted by John 
Townshend.  His solution to the straw problem he had set up has an eerily contemporary 
ring to it.  In essence, Jeremiah sought a cram-down class action, whereby a defendant 
seeks to litigate an issue one time against all potential plaintiffs.  This is a little-used but 
recognized class action tactic, usually invoked by a confident defendant in an attempt to 
gain the preclusive effect of a class victory that an individual win would not provide.  
Certainly that was the case with Jeremiah:  although the Court of Appeals’ decision 
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required Jerry and Anthony’s case to be heard in Anne Arundel County, Judge Crain of 
the Prince George’s Circuit Court granted the injunction, meaning that Jeremiah’s 
injunction would be heard by a Prince George’s chancellor, not an Anne Arundel judge. 
 The Court of Appeals, though, was not amused.  Although several issues were 
raised on appeal, the Court decided that it need only rule on one of them to dismiss 
Jeremiah Townshend’s equity bill.  Justice Mason recognized the implications of 
Jeremiah’s strategy, and wrote that the “alleged slave” would be unable to challenge his 
servile status if the injunction was heard in Prince George’s County.  The Court held that 
John Townshend’s sanity, and his capacity to execute a deed of manumission, would be 
determined by the same tribunal that heard the petition for freedom.  The Court’s 
irritation with Jeremiah’s ploy is evident from the tone of the opinion, and from the fact 
that it levied costs against him, not only for the Court of Appeals proceedings but also for 
the proceedings in Prince George’s county. 
V. The Trial And Final Appeal 
 At some point in the proceedings, Anthony appears to have ceased to be a 
plaintiff.  His name is not listed in the caption of third Court of Appeals decision, and the 
Court’s second opinion refers to the “alleged slave” in the singular.  Most tellingly, the 
trial in Anne Arundel County began with Jeremiah Townshend’s contention that Jerry, 
and only Jerry, was over 45 years old when John Townshend executed his deed of 
manumission.  (This was an important point.  Under Maryland law, a slave over 45 could 
not be manumitted.)  Whether Anthony had died in the interim, whether he lost his 
willingness to continue as a plaintiff in the action, or whether the slaves had realized that 
he was so clearly over 45 that his continued presence in the case would harm the other 
slaves’ chances of freedom is unknown.  The trial court refused to grant Jeremiah’s 
request for a directed verdict based on Jerry’s age and the case proceeded. 
 As Jeremiah had admitted during his petition for an injunction, the deeds of 
manumission appeared to be valid on their face.  Accordingly, the evidentiary burden 
was on him to show that his father was insane when he executed the deeds, and he 
applied himself to the task with gusto.  He produced a witness who testified that he had 
known John Townshend between 1826 and 1831 and that he had conversed frequently 
with John during this time.  From John’s conduct, manner, conversations and general 
appearance, this witness testified that, in his opinion, John Townshend was insane and 
incapable of executing a valid deed or contract.  This witness also testified to other 
conversations he had had with John subsequent to his execution of the 1831 deed of 
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manumission “to throw light upon the state of his mind at the time of its execution.”  
Despite Alexander’s objections, this testimony, and the testimony of other witnesses 
offering substantially the same testimony, was admitted. 
 The most damaging testimony offered by Jeremiah, however, came from Dr. 
John Fonderen, the director of Maryland’s Hospital for the Insane.  Dr. Fonderen had 
attended the trial and listened to the testimony of the other witnesses.  Jeremiah’s 
attorney then called him to take the stand and asked him the following question.”  “Upon 
the hypothesis that the testimony given by the witnesses in this case, of the acts and 
declarations of John Townshend as to his personal intercourse with God, is all true, and 
that at the time Townshend made these declarations, as to this intercourse and its 
character, he believed what he declared, what would be your opinion as to the condition 
of his mind at the times of such declarations?”  Over objection, this question was allowed 
and, although the answer is unrecorded, it cannot have been favorable to Jerry and the 
other slaves. 
 The trial court ruled in favor of Jeremiah and, for the third time, the slaves found 
themselves before the Court of Appeals.  This time, though, the Court ruled against them.  
Justice Mason wrote that the admissibility of evidence tending to show John 
Townshend’s alleged insanity prior to and at the time of the execution of the 1831 deed 
was not objectionable.  Moreover, the testimony concerning John’s mental status after 
the 1831 deed was executed was similarly admissible “because it tended to show the 
nature and character of the insanity under which the party was supposed to labor.”  In 
this regard, the Court found the continuing nature of John Townshend’s eccentric 
behavior to be of particular importance. 
 The Court of Appeals was less certain about Dr. Forderen’s testimony, noting that 
the issue was “not free from difficulty upon the authorities.”   
Upon an examination of the cases it will be found, that there is 
considerable conflict among them.  It is clear that you cannot ask a 
witness, an expert, his opinion, as to the state of a party’s mind, upon the 
evidence submitted to the jury.  To do so would be to transfer the 
functions of the jury to the witness, and would permit him to decide upon 
the very fact at issue, and thus to control the verdict of the jury.  It is 
equally clear, on the other hand, that you may ask such a witness his 
opinion upon a state of facts, hypothetically put, based upon the evidence, 
and this is in fact, the proper way to submit such questions to a witness. 
 
  
  
 9 
 Although the Court was not happy with the form of the question as asked by 
Jeremiah’s attorney, it decided that it was sufficiently close to the usual form of such 
questions that the trial court did not commit reversible error in allowing it.  Accordingly, 
the Court held that there was no reversible error and affirmed the jury’s verdict. 
 VI. Conclusion 
Nine years after their bid for freedom had begun, Jeremiah Townshend’s slaves 
had no more options open to them.  They would remain slaves for another eight years 
when, in the wake of the Civil War, the Maryland Constitution was amended and slavery 
was abolished.  Nothing more is known about them.  Jeremiah died in 1892, at age 74, 
and is buried together with his wife and children in the McKendree Methodist Church 
Cemetery.  Ironically, an unidentified family slave (it seems unlikely to be Jerry) also has 
an unmarked grave in the family plot. 
There are many lessons to be drawn from this trilogy of opinions from the Court 
of Appeals.  Apart from the insight into what was deemed to be appropriate trial practice 
in the 1850’s, the realization that seemingly contemporary legal maneuvering has been 
around for a long time, and the beneficial impact of one dedicated pro bono lawyer, the 
cases teach us powerful lessons about the importance of freedom and the lengths to 
which those who will be economically disadvantaged by it will go to keep people 
enslaved.  
On a less emotionally charged plane, though, perhaps the overarching general 
lesson that these 150 year old decisions can offer is that cases are more than just dry 
recitations of the law.  To the extent that Negro Jerry v. Townshend,  2 Md. 274 (1852) 
will ever be studied for its legal significance, it stands as one of the early leading opinions 
on intra-state removal, as well being the earliest reported class action in Maryland.  For 
those involved in the case, though, and hopefully for us today as well, it tells us that cases 
are about people, not just principles.  As lawyers, and as citizens, this is an important 
lesson to remember.2 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  In addition to the Court of Appeals’ decisions, and the various statutory enactments 
referred to in the text, the following materials supplied valuable information:  Hall v. Mullin,  5 
Har. & J. 190 (1821);  Effie A. G. Bowie,  Across the Years in Prince George’s County, (1947);  Jean 
A Sargent,  Stones and Bones:  Cemetery Records of Prince George’s County Maryland (1984).  
